WORKING PAPER

Opportunities for Robotic Landmine Clearance

James Trevelyan

 

Note: This paper was written before we gained a full appreciation of the demining problem. We have significantly changed our research direction by visiting real minefields.

Robots are not likely to be useful in minefields for a long time yet. Why Not? - Click for More

 

 

Landmines Working Paper 1: Robotic Landmine Clearance

James Trevelyan

May 1995

Department of Mechanical and Materials Engineering
The University of Western Australia
Nedlands 6907, Western Australia.
E-mail: jamest@mech.uwa.edu.au

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Summary

This paper is based in information we have been able to obtain since we started research on this problem in December 1995. The technical solutions proposed later in the paper are based on certain assumptions which we are unable to confirm at the time of writing. First that an acceptable proportion of landmines can be detonated by firmly probing the ground in the way a human foot would strike the ground in walking. Second that a mechanical probe can be designed to withstand the repeated mine explosions which it would set off.

This paper provides background information for a research project which aims to find improved ways of removing abandoned land mines. Later papers will present more technical details on detection and eradication techniques.

 

LINKThe Landmines Problem

LINKThe current solutions

LINKRobots

LINKOperating Costs and Finance

LINKAcknowledgements

LINKReferences

 

The Landmines Problem

According to current estimates, about 100,000,000 anti-personnel and other landmines have been laid in different parts of the world. (This estimate is quoted by numerous sources, but it is only an indication which is based on a wide range of information gathered in different countries. No one appears to have detailed accurate estimates. The number of mines which have to be cleared to restore economically useful land and resources could be much less than this estimate. ) A similar number exist in stockpiles and about 2,000,000 new ones are being laid each year. These mines, and other unexploded ammunition, are causing between 500 and 800 deaths and maiming 2000 per month (Report on UN International Meeting on Mine Clearance, Geneva July 5-7th 1995 by J. Nicoud, from Mines Advisory Group), almost entirely innocent civilians who had no part in the conflicts for which the mines were laid. Anti-personnel mines are usually designed not to kill, but to inflict horrible injuries instead (McGrath 1994 gives comprehensive information on landmine types and their effects). However many victims eventually die of their injuries, and suffer a long and agonising death, usually with scant medical attention (MAG 1994).

Some countries have banned the use of landmines and others are supportive of a complete ban. (Australian Government 1996, moratorium also announced in April 1996 by UK Government.) However, their low cost ($3 - $30 --- dollar values are based on United States currency throughout) and the large numbers in existing stockpiles make them an attractive weapon for insurgency groups which operate in many countries with internal conflicts---the most common cause of wars today. They are often used for self-defence by villages and groups of people travelling in many districts where civil law and order provides little effective protection. Angola, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia, Laos, Kuwait, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Falkland Islands. A familiar and incomplete list of recent conflicts and landmine proliferation.

Apart from deaths and injuries to people, the major effect is to deny access to land and its resources, causing deprivation among the affected populations. Regardless of any efforts to stop the further use of landmines, the safe restoration of productive land is an urgent issue in affected countries.

The UN is clearing about 85,000 mines each year though funding is being cut back as the UN works through its current funding crisis. Other non government organizations (NGO) such as the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) are clearing mines (MAG Annual Report 1994/95) but they measure their work in terms of a few square kilometres per year.

At this rate, according to UN sources, it will take about $33,000,000,000 and 1,000 years to eliminate the currently known landmines (UN Mine Clearance Operations reported in Red Cross 1995). Since similar statistics have been reported in many different publications, they may all be based on a single original survey, and we have not yet been able to obtain this data. Nor do we know how reliable this information is, and we do not know which mines have been used in different affected areas and countries. Cost estimates vary as well and it is not clear what measures they are based upon.

The aim of this paper is to review current initiatives to solve this problem and to propose new directions where robotics and automation technology might provide a useful contribution. It is clear from the literature that current technologies are not effective (See Bachground paper No. 5 for International Meeting on Mine Clearance 1995).

It is important to understand that humanitarian demining (removing all mines from large areas used by people and animals) is not a priority for military engineering efforts and it would not be realistic to expect military research and development to provide solutions. When confronted with a minefield, armed forces need a path to reach their next objective. They can afford to clear a narrow path or simply plough a track through the minefield. 100% removal is not essential: the aim is to reduce the risk (mainly to vehicles) to an "acceptable" level.

Mines have been designed to make clearance tedious and difficult. Any improvement on military detection and removal techniques tends to lead to design changes which defeat the improvement. Thus many modern mines are made almost entirely from plastic and trigger mechanisms have been refined to defeat clearance devices such as fuel/air explosions above a minefield. Plastic mines are therefore almost impossible to detect with current detectors --- though dogs can be trained to detect the presence of explosive.

While dogs can help to identify areas to be demined, they are not reliable and consistent enough for locating individual mines. Modern plastic blast mines are cheap and easy to manufacture. However, fragmentation mines still contain large amounts of metal and are therefore easier to detect.

If a technical solution for large scale landmine clearance is to be effective, it should not be seen as useful for tactical purposes because this would almost certainly trigger design changes to defeat it. If, for example, we developed a hyper-sensitive artificial "nose" to smell the minute traces of gas leaking from explosive charges, this would encourage mine manufacturers to seal the explosive charges better or to use explosives which release less detectable gas. Alternatively, a force commander could lay small pieces of plastic explosive (without detonators) simply to confuse such a detector.

While some assistance may come from aid organisations, it seems unlikely that wealthy countries will provide money for clearing landmines which typically cost $300 - $600 each to remove. (Current estimates from Afghanistan - demining costs vary widely and depend on the types of mine encountered, density of mines, and environmental factors.) The people most affected by mines have the greatest need and incentive, but the least resources.

If the cost of demining can be reduced with better techniques to a level which relates to the economic output of the land to be cleared, financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF might be persuaded to provide low interest long term loans to help people buy and maintain the equipment to restore their land and economic potential. Since loans are available to help with irrigation works, it seems reasonable to think that comparable loans might be available to restore mine-affected land.

However, this means that we should look for low cost solutions based on simple equipment which can be operated without costly technical experts from "western" countries.

Conventions on warfare require minefields to be marked on maps when they are created so they can be removed after hostilities end. However, even reasonably well-organised armies can ignore this simple requirement in the heat of battle, especially when they withdraw or are in desperate circumstances. Most mines laid by Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands were unrecorded. Guerrilla groups seldom have the administrative support to record their minefields. Therefore, most of the mines causing problems now were not recorded when they were laid.

Government agencies provide little protection or security to their civilian populations in many countries where mines have been laid. Therefore civilians, travellers and traders make use of mines for self defence by laying their own minefields. Travellers have been known to protect their campsites with mines, and to collect the mines each morning before moving on. Therefore, some of the mines are no longer in their original positions, even if they were originally recorded.

Older children and adults have been known to use mines for fishing because they are deprived of agricultural land and are desperate for food. Typically they will try to detonate a mine in shallow water by throwing rocks at it (McGrath 1994, p43 on mines as tools). The fish die in the shock wave from the explosion. Many people trying this also receive injuries, or are killed by flying rock fragments.

Mines have been laid in all kinds of terrain for some time now, so local changes will have affected the landscape. In fertile areas, or arid land relieved of grazing animals, vegetation will have grown. Mines which were originally on the surface may have been overgrown by bushes or grasses or buried by eroded sand or soil. Buried mines may now lie under tree roots or even under stems.

The current solutions

The first step is to educate local people about mines (MAG 1994/95 ). Children are particularly at risk because they are not careful when walking along unfamiliar paths, and cannot see as far ahead (because they are not as tall as adults). Children are naturally curious, and will often collect mines and other unexploded ordnance to use as toys or to sell, even as scrap metal.

The next step is to mark known minefields and preferably fence them to discourage people and large animals from entering. It is important to realise that animals often have far more value than we realise. A sheep which may sell for $10 in Australia may be worth the equivalent of $200 in Afghanistan, not allowing for war-induced scarcity. When one considers that the average income is often more than 20 times less, the real value of a sheep may be as much as $4,000 in our terms. Sending animals to trigger mines is not an economic (or ethical) solution.

Once local people have been educated and minefields have been marked, work can commence on eliminating them. If possible, vegetation is removed by burning beforehand.

A flail can eliminat many mines from flat, open areas (Red Cross 1995). This is an armoured vehicle which carries a spinning drum with chains which beat the ground ahead of the vehicle to trigger surface or buried mines. Unfortunately these vehicles are expensive ($350,000) and usually eliminate only about 90% of mines. Some mines can be thrown by the flails and they cannot operate on boggy or rough terrain. Therefore, a more thorough method is needed as well.

Mines with a high metal content (such as fragmentation mines and some home-made blast mines using metal fuses) can be detected with metal detectors. Deminers dressed in protective vests and face shields carefully sweep sensitive metal detectors side-to-side above the ground. They need to watch carefully for trip-wires which activate many types of mine. When metal is discovered, the position is marked. Then, lying face down on the ground, the deminer carefully probes the ground with a rod or bayonet to confirm that it is a mine-like object. The rod or prodder (preferably fibreglass) needs to be inserted at a shallow angle, about 30°, to avoid triggering the mine. Then the deminer removes the earth from around the suspected mine until enough has been exposed to confirm that it is a mine. More often than not, this will simply reveal a drink can, a discarded metal part or a metal fragment from an earlier explosion. False alarm rates from typical metal detectors are typically 10,000:1 (from sources with field experience in Afghanistan).

Plastic mines can only be detected by gently probing the ground with a prodder. Once again, when a worker feels a suspect object, the surrounding earth is removed by hand.

Mines discovered in this way are preferably destroyed in situ by a shaped charge explosion detonated remotely. Some mines have internal sensors which trigger an explosion if they are removed or tilted. Mines which can be made safe to handle can be accumulated in a dump and detonated more economically in a single explosion. Mines which are not immediately destroyed may be stolen and sold.

Robots

Robots have limited use in this scenario. See Bachground paper No. 5 for International Meeting on Mine Clearance 1995 for specific comments on robotics. Apart from their cost and the difficulties of operating them without well-trained people to support and maintain them, robots are usually delicate machines which only work well in a clean, predictable, production line environment.

However, it is easy to ignore the fact that satellite TV antennas and video cassette players are more delicate, and are built to far more precise specifications, and are now widely used in developing countries, even where landmines are common. Some groups use highly sophisticated weapons technology in regional conflicts where landmines proliferate. We should not judge whether technology is appropriate on the basis of apparent wealth and education.

What then, can robots contribute?

We need to keep the attributes of robots. They come in many different forms, but they all have important common characteristics. If we work within their known limitations, we are more likely to end up with a practical device.

It is difficult to design extremely robust mechanisms which are capable of delicate manipulation. Such mechanisms tend to have delicate parts which need protection from mechanical overloads.


Figure 1. Two possible ways of using robots to help with landmine clearance. Robots can work well without close human supervision if they perform simple repetitive tasks which can be well defined (by prior programming).

wp1-f1a wp1-f1b


Robots work well with:

 

  • simple, repetitive, well-defined movements and operations;
  • electronic sensors to measure process characteristics on-line;
  • high precision tasks;
  • occasional human interaction or supervision for optimum efficiency;
  • environments free of hazards such as dust, dirt, corrosion, and temperature extremes;
  • complex movements provided sufficient information is available to calculate required movement;
  • electronic sensors for modifying the robot's movements in response to task variations, provided the robot is rigid and quick to respond.

Robots have often failed to work well when taken outside these situations. For example, much research has been directed towards autonomous vehicles (mobile robots) for use outdoors, but finding a combination of sensors which provide reliable long-term operation has been extremely difficult. This problem is not yet solved.

Robots can perform tedious and monotonous tasks.

One task which a robot could do quite well is scanning the ground to locate and classify buried objects with electronic sensors. Some sensing systems, such as ground penetrating radar, require the sensor antenna to be located at many well-defined positions in a grid pattern. ( See papers by Pichot & Dourthe, Daniels & Dittmer, Chigenll, Azevedo et al, Garriott et al, Fritzsche and Trinkhaus in WAPM'95 Proceedings. ) Robots may be essential for using this kind of sensor.

Robots can perform tasks without a person present.

We need to keep people away from mines. Therefore robots can help with this by performing mine-removal operations remotely.

We could use robots as teleoperators, thereby using the operator to control all the robot's movements. TV cameras provide remote "eyes" for the operator. This technique has been used for bomb-disposal robots and is in common use for tethered and free-ranging underwater robots. This is an effective combination where the task is difficult, does not need to be done quickly, and close human interaction (or supervision) is essential. Unfortunately the equipment is expensive and is often unsuited for tedious and repetitive tasks.

Robots can work unattended performing simple repetitive tasks, possibly quite slowly. Probing the ground in a predetermined pattern is one example. Another is scanning the ground with a sensor device. The key point here is that the task must be simple enough for a robot to perform without manual intervention. Some form of automatic monitoring may be needed to stop the task and call for assistance if something goes wrong.

Robots need protection from environmental extremes.

Mine clearance poses an environmental problem for any robotic device. Even if we assume, for a moment, that the equipment will not be exposed to the risk of accidental explosions, there are still some basic requirements for a field operable robot system:

reliable power supply, and internal protection from power supply interruptions, temperature moderation (avoiding direct sun exposure, heating in extreme cold), protection from dust, corrosion, vibration, protection for delicate mechanical parts from excessive force or vibration loads, particularly in transport between sites, and adequate reliability, and a secure, clean maintenance depot with trained support staff

Since one of the main reasons for considering a robot is to remove people from the mine explosion hazard, we need to consider how to safeguard the robot itself.

Here we can adopt some standard engineering solutions. First, we can design the robot to be mechanically robust and provide adequate shielding from blast and high velocity fragments. Additional dust and shock protection will be essential. Second, we can arrange the robot so that the components which may be expensive to protect are placed out of danger.


Figure 2. Two recently proposed concepts for robotic mine clearance. wp1-f2

Figure 2 shows two types of device which have been proposed recently. The "mine-rat" is a small light-weight autonomous vehicle which carries a sensor to detect landmines (Nicoud and Mächler 1995).. It is light enough not to trigger surface or buried mines. An alternative is a larger and heavier vehicle which can withstand anti-personnel mine explosions (Velez and Thomas 1995). Both have serious disadvantages.

The "mine-rat" can still disturb trip-wires and cannot be "hardened" against accidental explosions. Also, some surface mines (such as the Russian butterfly mine) can be triggered by successive applications of lower force loads, so a "mine-rat" would be at risk from these devices.

The heavier vehicle would almost certainly be susceptible to anti-tank mines.

Both vehicles, however, require a reliable means for navigating themselves across the terrain. While GPS can provide a position reference, it does not solve the problem of locating and identifying obstacles, and selecting an appropriate path to follow towards a desired position. So both vehicles require "human" drivers (in addition to GPS for position measurement and recording). This, in turn, necessitates a "drivers station" in a support vehicle nearby, much like the bomb disposal robots mentioned before.

Both these devices attempt to access the minefield by traversing the ground, and expose themselves to severe control difficulties and explosion hazards as a result. If we approach the minefield from above, instead, we can almost completely eliminate these problems.

Figure 3 shows another approach, though it does not look much like a robot. Here a tool (a simple probe is shown) is suspended above the minefield by a system of steel cables controlled by winches on three or more poles or towers at the corners of the minefield.


Figure 3 - A minefield can be accessed more safely from above.

wp1-f3


This device could significantly improve detection techniques because the location of the detector is known for each measurement. Compared with conventional hand-held detectors, much more sophisticated signal processing should be feasible, and it may be possible to reduce false alarm rates on metallic mines and non-metallic mines with metal fuses.

This device will work over any terrain where temporary poles can be erected. Therefore, it should work over hills and waterways as easily as open agricultural or urban land.

This device requires access to sites for the poles which may need back stays for support. Therefore, if the minefield extends further than the maximum allowable span, a path must be cleared to provide access to erect the poles carrying the winches. In an urban environment, taller buildings or power poles could provide mountings for the winches (See, for example, photograph on p54 of Red Cross 1995).

The winches need to be well controlled to provide accurate positioning. A computer can do this with suitable electric drive motors. Some damping is needed to help eliminate unwanted "bouncing" or swaying in the suspension cables.


Figure 4. An obstacle such as a tree restricts access to part of the operating area beyond the two nearest poles. If the tree branches are well clear of the ground, it may be possible to bring the device close to the trunk in which the "shadow" zones (inaccessible) are much smaller. (wp1-f4) wp1-f4

The shadow zones are obtained by remembering that the probe needs clear lines to three poles. For each combination of three poles, the probe must be within the inner triangle shown in figure 4.

In a forest, it may be wiser to use the tree as supports for the winches and operate over much smaller areas between trees.

Obstacles will reduce the "coverage" provided by this device, and pose a similar problem to the one faced by autonomous ground vehicles. However, this could be overcome by allowing an operator to use the device to map obstacles once the device is deployed above a minefield. Then the device can operate automatically, carrying a sensor device over the minefield or probing the ground to trigger mine explosions. In the latter case, the sensor would be removed leaving a simple, robust probe device which could be entirely passive (i.e. not requiring any external power or energy source).

Operating Costs and Finance

How much would a device like this cost to build and operate?

Apart from the computer to control it and optional sensing devices, the major cost would be the winch units and the associated controls. Using typical costs for conventional robots as a guide, each winch device would probably cost about $10,000 after allowing for environmental protection (A typical mid-range industrial robot system costs about $50,000 including the controller. Of this, the joint motors (6 per robot) cost about $5,000 each with their controller circuits). Each winch would handle two cables in tandem, and so four winches would provide a basic system. Assuming that the system design and software could be written off by appropriate research agency funding, it would cost about $60,000 to $80,000 to build a field operable system. This would be capable of mechanically probing for mines across an area the size of a football stadium at a rate of about 1 position every second.

We will assume that supporting labour, transport and electric power (from small mobile generators) is already available---these costs have not been included. Maintenance support and training will be covered by a fixed percentage of the capital cost---assumed to be 15%. Further, we will assume that the equipment will last 5 years and has to be completely replaced after then. Therefore, the operating costs can be approximated as 35% of the capital cost.

Assuming we need to probe the ground 400 times per square metre (5 cm between probe points), the probing rate would be about 8 square metres per hour.

A 120 by 80 metre minefield (approx. 10,000 sq. metres) would therefore take at least 2 months to clear this way. Given appropriate programming, the system could operate automatically for extended periods (up to a day) with minimal supervision. Each time a mine explosion occurs, a visual check would be needed for damage to the cables, though this could be detected by appropriate sensors. Based on a capital cost of $80,000, the annual operating cost would be about $28,000.

If the minefield originally contained 50 mines, and all except one were detonated this way, the operating cost to clear 1 hectare would be about $5,000, and the 49 mines would have been eliminated at a cost of about $100 each.

Surface penetrating radar has been suggested as one means of detecting buried objects such as mines. Assuming that we can scan 50 square metres of ground per hour, it would take 200 hours to scan the minefield. Assuming that the false alarm rate is 50:1, and that possible mine locations about 20 cm square are probed to trigger an explosion, we would need to probe 2500 sites (for 50 mines) taking about three minutes each. This would take about 120 hours. Thus the time required to clear the minefield would be reduced to about 2 weeks. Assuming that the sensor technology doubles the cost (i.e. the sensor and software costs $80,000), the operating cost for 1 hectare would be about $2200 and the mines would have been eliminated for about $50 each.

Both methods are substantially cheaper than existing techniques which predominantly apply to high metal-content mines which can be detected with moderately priced equipment.

Eliminating landmines from useful land areas can be compared with buying new land, from an economic perspective. Land which was not previously accessible can be made available for agriculture or habitation. For agricultural land, we could compare the capital costs to make a given area of irrigated land available for food production. Alternatively we can compare purchase or renting costs for land in agricultural or urban areas. If the cost of mine clearance per hectare is substantially less than these costs, then it may be feasible to obtain international finance to pay for the equipment.

It is not easy to compare land values in countries affected by conflicts. Assuming that the land being recovered is comparable to productive agricultural land in SE Asia, we can compare clearance costs with rice production. Typical rice land produces between 1 and 8 tonnes per hectare (Khor 1995) (Cambodia seems to have the lowest productivity --- Encyclopaedia of the Third World (1984) quotes 1.2 tonne/hectare for Cambodia - one of the lowest in the world) and the rice is worth between $500 and $1000 per tonne (Public Ledger No. 71960, April 20th 1996). Urban land is much more expensive. One indication, based on a developing country in South America, is $50,000 per hectare. (Based on the estimated cost of fringe urban land in Columbia about 15 km from a city centre. Actual value quoted is US$14,000 in 1978 and indexed to 1995 US$)

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank all the people who have contributed to this paper, including D. Macey for background research and checking, R. Bird (DSTO Melbourne) for outline technical information on Australian military work and published technical reviews, Dr. A. Churches (UNSW) for background and encouragement, and the Australian Army School of Military Engineering. Also to Mines Advisory Group, WA Branch of International Red Cross, and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Microprocessors and Interfaces Laboratory (EPFL-LAMI), Lausanne, Switzerland for supplying their publications.

References

Copies of all reference material available from the author on request.

Anonymous (1995) International Meeting on Mine Clearance, Background Paper No. 5. For discussion by experts, Panel E "New Technologies in Mine and Minefield Detection and Mine Clearance", available from author.Australian Government Statement (1996)

Australia pledges support for a global ban on anti-personnel landmines and unilaterally suspends use. Joint statement by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence FA22, 15th April.

Azevedo, A. G., Gavel, D. T., Mast, J. E., and Warhus, J. P. Landmine detection and imaging using micropower impulse radar (MIR). In WAPM '95 (above)

Chignell, R. J. Ground probing radar - a technology ready for mine detection equipment development. In WAPM '95 (above)CMAC (1995).

Facts and figures: Progress report 1992-1995. CMAC, Phnom Penh.

Daniels, D. and Dittmer, J. Design challenges for ultra-wideband radar for AP mine detection. In WAPM '95 (above)

Fritzsche, M. and Trinkhaus, P. Detection of buried landmines using ground penetrating radar and a metal detector: first results of field experiments. In WAPM '95 (above)

Garriott, G., Land, D., Nillies, J., Vance, G, and Sherbondy, K. A multi-sensor system for demining. In WAPM '95 (above)

Khor, M. (1994). Economic Globalization and Eroding International Cooperation: Implications for Agricultural and Rural Sustainability, Third World Resurgence Series No. 67.

McGrath, R. (1994). Landmines, Legacy of Conflict: A Manual for Development Workers, Oxfam, Oxford, UK.

McGrath, R. (1995). 1994/95 Report on the Activities of the Mines Advisory Group, 54a Main Street, Cockermouth, Cumbria CA13 9LU England.

Nicoud, J .D. (1995) Proceedings of Workshop on Anti-personnel Mine Detection and Removal WAPM '95, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Microprocessors and Interfaces Laboratory (EPFL-LAMI), Lausanne, Switzerland.

Nicoud, J. D. and Mächler, P. (1995) Pemex-B: a low cost robot for searching anti-personnel mines. In WAPM '95 (above)

Pichot, C. and Dourthe, C. Microwave diffraction tomography of buries objects. In WAPM '95 (above)Public Ledger No. 71960 (1996) from http://www.netbenefit.co.uk/ledger/index.html

Red Cross (1995) Landmines must be stopped: Chapter VI Mine Clearance. Special Brochure, International Committee of Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland.

Velez, G. and Thomas, H. (1995) Requirements for robotics in explosive ordnance disposal operations in tropical and desert areas. In WAPM '95 (above)

World Bank (1996). World Development Report 1994, Oxford University Press (in press).

Some World Wide Web sites offering information:

LINKSwiss Federal Institute of Technology Microprocessors and Interfaces Laboratory (EPFL-LAMI), Lausanne, Switzerland: WWW Page

LINKRed Cross: WWW Page

LINKUnited Nations: WWW Page

 

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