Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Problem in Lebanon

Report by A/Prof. James Trevelyan, University of Western Australia

Objectives of Research Visit

The original objective of my visit to Lebanon was to assess the technology needs of deminers. I had planned a visit to Jordan and Egypt which have well-publicised mine problems, and I was aware of some landmine problems in Lebanon as well.

However, when I started to meet people in Lebanon, I realised that there is little information on the nature of the mine problem in Lebanon. Therefore, I could not pursue a comprehensive approach to technology needs of deminers. Instead, I decided to prepare a technical report on mine and UXO problems in Lebanon to make suggestions for actions, and also to evaluate some of the technical problems of mine clearance in Lebanon.

This report, therefore, consists of two parts: the first part looks at the mine and UXO problem in general terms and suggests some courses of action which could help speed up clearance efforts. The second part takes a closer look at the technical issues and a third part presents some photographs of mined areas.

Why has the landmine problem been under-estimated until now?

During the civil war in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990, hardly a single town or village escaped battle damage. Parts of Beirut were devastated to the extent that total demolition of entire blocks was necessary before reconstruction could begin.

The conflict involved the Lebanese army, local militia groups, the Syrian army, and the Israeli army. All participants are thought to have used mines, and Israel also used cluster bombs.

Despite the apparent intensity of the conflict, its duration, and the known use of mines, the only information available outside Lebanon is a brief mention in the public UN database on landmines (http://www.un.org/). There is also a brief reference by the US Department of State with an estimate of 8795 landmines in the country, which is small in comparison to estimates from other countries. Very recently, the UN has released an assessment mission report on the landmine problem in Lebanon. This is a big step forward but contributes little technical information.

Lebanon has not received much assistance from foreign NGO's which are often the first to bring landmine problems to the attention of international media.

There is almost no public awareness of the landmine problem inside Lebanon. Given the daily threats to human life during the civil war, and the continuing fighting in the south, the threat to civilians from mines and unexploded ordnance possibly seems slight in comparison. It is only now when the norms of peacetime life are returning that the impact of landmines is starting to be recognised.

The National Demining Office in the Ministry of Defence has only recently been set up with assistance from the US. Total US contributions to date are US$1.7 million (since 1998). Much of this is in the form of basic equipment for training for National Demining Bureau (NDB) staff. USAID is supporting a mine awareness programme by the NDB and the World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF).

The staff officers are on a steep learning curve, but their resources are fully stretched with emergency and short term issues. Daily calls for assistance come from building companies and other people who have discovered unexploded shells and bombs.

Occupation of the country by foreign and other military groups constrains the Lebanese Army to a comparatively small part of the country (see map).

The Lebanese government is making a significant contribution in its own right to solving this problem. Although there is no specific defence budget allocation for demining, about 250 military personnel are involved in clearance activities. At current rates, this corresponds to approximately US$2,250,000 each year.

The government is acutely sensitive to any publicity which could affect tourism income. There may be a perception by some in government that publicity for landmines and other hazards in Lebanon could affect tourist revenue.

Note: the experience in Croatia shows that a healthy tourism industry can operate, even where hundreds of thousands of tourists have to drive through some of the most densely mined regions in that country.

My research visit

During my brief visit to Lebanon I met with many people, including the following:

General Sami Al-Khatib, Deputy for Bekaa, President of the Parliamentary Commission on Defence of the Interior and Security.

Landowners and other people from the Tannourine district.

Ms. Habbouba Aoun, Director, Landmines Resource Centre, Balamand University, Beirut.

Dr. Nadeem Karam, Director, World Rehabilitation Fund Beirut Office (WRF), Mr. Toufic Rizkallah, Landmines Project Coordinator, and other WRF staff.

Col. George Sowaya, National Demining Office, Ministry of Defence, his staff, and deminers working at the Souk El-Gharb site on the mountains overlooking Beirut airport.

Dr. George NasrDr. Eli Badr, and other staff at the Lebanese American University, Byblos.

I drove through as much of the country as possible to gain a first-hand appreciation of the terrain and state of the country. I visited mined areas near the Tannorine cedar forest and Souk El Gharb where many mines were used.

For a national demining organisation to be effective, it needs to be recognised as neutral by all military entities and by the population at large, so that it can operate wherever it is needed in the country. The Lebanese Army does not meet this criterion, but the personnel responsible for demining are doing what they can.

Occupation of the country by foreign and other military groups constrains the Lebanese Army to a comparatively small part of the country (see map). The Lebanese Army is restricted to zone 1 principally. In Zone 2 they are not permitted to operated within 40 km of Israeli forces. The north coastal part of Zone 3 has recently been opened for a shared military presence with the Syrian Army. Zone 5 has a Lebanese Police presence, but the Army is restricted to barracks in Jizzin. The Army is also unable to enter the areas in Tyre and Sidon containing Palestinian Camps. (Harris 2000)

The current political and military situation represents possibly the most significant factor restricting the scope for demining. The announced Israeli withdrawal could lead to major changes in this situation (scheduled for July 2000).

Evidence available on landmine and UXO problem

Direct Evidence: Civilian Casualties

The Landmines Resource Center (LRC) of Balamand University was set up in 1997 after the Institute of Health Sciences discovered that the high level of demand for prosthetheses (artificial legs and arms) in Lebanon was due to mine injuries. They conducted a community-based survey in the area near Rachaya in the south-eastern Bakaa valley and learned that there had been about 400 mine casualties (approx 40% fatal), mainly to males aged 15-35 engaged in agriculture.

This came as a surprise because no one seemed aware of a mine problem in Lebanon at the time. After the publicity given to the Ottawa Treaty, the Institute approached the Swedish Save the Children organisation for support for the survey work.

The main problem they faced was obtaining information. The villages in the area were poor and remote, with very little education. The only feasible way to collect the information was through personal contact. The LRC established a network of community representatives who were trained (as volunteers) to collect the information. They also organised a national symposium in February 1998 on both rehabilitation and demining. Through the network, LRC has organised a much improved arrangement for injured survivors to have prostheses fitted by coordinating transport to and from their villages. Medical support in the remote villages is minimal of course.

One of the main areas of concern to the LRC is the Shouf mountains south of Beirut where military campaigns caused large numbers of people to leave their homes. Many of these people were forced to move several times as fighting erupted in different parts of the country. They have been slow to return, for several reasons. First, there has been understandable reluctance to move back. Second, once village people move to urban areas, they become tied to economic resources there: jobs and schools. Third, with the shortage of habitable housing, other displaced people moved into vacant houses, and demand payment to relocate themselves so they too can find other accommodation. The existence of extended confrontation lines in the mountains and the likelihood that the occupying forces consolidated their positions using mines suggests that civilian casualties may be a major problem as displaced people return.

In February 1999, the LRC organised a conference on the needs of Arab countries. The conference proceedings were in Arabic, and so are not easily accessible. Representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait and Morrocco attended the conference. (Refer to LRC for details)

With US support, the LRC is now conducting a national survey and preliminary figures suggest between 1500 and 2000 casualties (approx 42% fatal) since the civil war ended (or nearly 200 annually). These statistics are not yet confirmed as the survey data is still being processed.

Many of the survivors did not know what kind of device had caused their injuries. There is almost no public information about hazardous devices. (A US-funded mine awareness campaign was due to start in October).

This rate of casualties is high compared with several other countries with severe landmine problems, for example approximately 50 each year in Bosnia Herzegovina).

In the majority of affected communities, the social impact is severe with families unable to use the famland on which they depend for their livelihoods. Consequently they have little or no access to health services, education or employment.

Survey activities are continuing and LRC can be approached for further information.

Other Direct Evidence

I met several people with direct experience of mines in different parts of the country.

I met a former militia commander who told me he had used mines during the war and had tried to remove them several years later. He lost his leg on one of his own mines. Some of the mines were of Israeli origin, others were from the former Soviet Union and several other countries.

I met a person who told me that her former village in the south had been ringed with mines to control civilian movements. This happened without warning. Before the mines were laid, there was a barbed wire fence erected by the South Lebanese Army (SLA). But people used to cut holes in the fence overnight and close them afterwards, so the fence was ineffective. After that, one day early in the morning, the SLA laid mines around the fence to stop people cutting holes in it.

I met one person who said that he knows people who saw the Syrian Army laying mines near Tannourine, but he thought that the Syrians removed their mines later. However, experience in other countries shows that it is almost impossible for an Army to remove all their mines, even when the minefields are accurately marked on the ground.

I met several people who told me they knew mine victims.

Survey

The National Demining Office is starting to create a national landmine and unexploded ordnance data base. However, they cannot access large regions of the country because of other occupying forces (see map).

This limitation is evident from the list of known mined areas submitted to the UN Assessment mission in 1999: all of the mined areas listed are in, or adjacent to the restricted region where the Lebanese Army can currently operate. (See discussion after map of Lebanon).

The intense social divisions which were both symptom and one of the causes of the civil war remain (other factors relate to the on-going Middle East conflict and internal politics of Syria). The Lebanese Army was, in effect, one of the many militias operating during the war. Because of this, I was told, there are many people who do not want to provide information, and perhaps some concern among Army personnel that the information might be deliberately inaccurate.

Experience from other countries shows that local people are often the most accurate and richest source of information about landmines. It is essential for any comprehensive survey (and demining agency) that they be seen as neutral by all parts of the communities in which they operate. If there is strong control by an international agency, with visible ex-patriates in charge, then some of these social divisions can be overcome. For instance, 5 years after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some demining organisations have built a neutral community profile to the extent that Bosnian Muslim companies can begin to operate in Serb-dominated areas of the country. However, this takes time and concerted efforts by the demining agencies.

Maps and Historical Records

Landmine and UXO survey work requires accurate maps which are currently not available. Aerial photographs could provide a valuable substitute for maps, but these are not available at the moment. Some digitised maps (1:20000) are being acquired from the US Government by the NDO. These are linked to an ACCESS database. However experience in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia with maps of this kind has been disappointing. In many parts of Croatia, the best maps have turned out to be hand-drawn maps dating from the Austrian-Hungarian empire which are over 100 years old, to scales of 1:5000 and 1:2500. These maps show individual agricultural and housing plots, and are used by local authorities for maintaining records of land ownership and for issuing building permits.

Experience in other countries (such as Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina) has shown that accurate records of military actions in the civil war are essential in assessing the likelihood of mines and the need for mine clearance work. However, it appears that little of this information has been compiled. There are few published books which provide useful information. It is difficult, given the divisions which still exist in the country, for anyone to accumulate this information. It would be highly desirable, possibly essential, that this information be collected by foreigners to establish the neutrality of the work. Obtaining information from Syrian military forces (the largest military force involved in the fighting) may be extremely difficult.

Collecting this kind of information has been difficult in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. People who have the knowledge there are either scared that they may incriminate themselves and later be prosecuted for war crimes, or simply demanding substantial cash payments for the information. Government agencies, in some instances, are reluctant to collect the information as it may make the mine problem even worse than they have already 'declared' it to be.

Indirect Evidence

There are many reports that mines were available to military groups participating in the conflict. For much of the civil war there were relatively well defined confrontation lines between the military groups and in other similar conflicts in other countries, mines were extensively used along such confrontation lines. Many participants are not willing to discuss their activities during the conflict because of on-going arrests and prosecutions by government agencies. Detailed information on military activities during the conflict seems to be scarce.

The conflict extended to nearly all the parts of the country I was able to visit. Although there has been extensive reconstruction, the evidence of shelling still shows on other buildings. I recently visited Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia for similar research, and, if one applies the criteria which are used there for mine hazard assessment, much of Lebanon, particularly the mountainous areas near the coast, has to be classified as 'potentially mined'. Several military groups removed the mines they laid. However, evidence from other countries shows that 100% removal of mines is seldom possible, even by the best organised and equipped armies. Therefore it is likely that some mines remain wherever mines were used.

Cluster bombs similar to those used on Lebanon have been used in other conflicts. A proportion of the bomblets fail to explode on impact but remain dangerous and unstable, lying on the ground. After some time they become dirty and lie hidden in vegetation. This is a major problem in Laos and eastern Cambodia where cluster bombs were used in the Vietnam war by US forces. This seems to be a problem in the Bekaa valley, the Shouf mountains, and particularly in the south of the country.

(photo to come)

Photo us74-31a: Downtown Beirut in September 1999. The buildings in the background have been rebuilt entirely from the basements up, leaving the country with a 21 billion dollar debt. They are mostly empty because businesses prefer to stay in the slightly more distant and less expensive areas of west Beirut where they relocated during the civil war. To the right lie Roman ruins, discovered during excavations for rebuilding the city.

The UXO problem must be considered at the same time as the landmine and cluster bomb problem. The proportion of shells and ammunition which explodes as intended varies enormously. US ammunition during the 1960's and 70's averaged 85% according to some informal estimates. Yugoslav ammunition used in the civil war of the 1990's exploded about 35-40% of the time, on average, according to military experts who cite figures from Yugoslav military exercises held in the late 1980's. Given the varied sources of ammunition used in the war, there is likely to be a very large problem, particularly in Beirut and other urban areas where reconstruction work is an urgent priority. It is useful to note that the main problem in urban areas is likely to be UXO, whereas the main problem in rural areas is likely to be landmines and cluster bombs. The final phase of the civil war saw intense artillery bomardments in the Beirut and Jubail areas in particular.

Finally, the ongoing daily fighting in the Israeli security zone and the likely existence of barrier minefields in and near that area, suggest that a major landmine and unexploded ordnance problem exists there. As far as I was able to ascertain, no one in Lebanon has begun to think about the work needed to make these areas safe for people to live in should the Israeli army withdraw.

While I was in Lebanon, some comparisons with Croatia seemed evident:

What are appropriate measures to describe the Lebanese mine and unexploded ordnance problem?

An estimate of the number of mines and other unexploded ordnance that need to be removed is meaningless, but is often the statistic quoted (eg the US Department of State). We cannot be sure how many mines have to be cleared, and after demining we cannot know if they have all been found. It is more meaningful to describe the size of contaminated areas, but no information is available. Sometimes one can quantify the area of land which is not available for use because of mines, or the fear of mines. However, most Lebanese people are not aware of the threat so the land is being used and casualties are the direct result.

At the moment the only available information is that a large number of people are being killed and injured over a large area of the country.

Suggestions for Action

Ottawa Treaty

Clearly it would be desirable for Lebanon to sign and ratify the Ottawa treaty on landmines. However, the government’s position was described to me in the following terms. "Since we have occupation forces in our country (referring to Israel directly, but indirectly also to Syria) and we cannot access all of our territory, we are unable to comply with the treaty requirements to remove landmines from our territory. Therefore we are unable to sign the treaty."

Evidence from other countries in the region (eg Jordan) shows that the international community is much more likely to assist mine clearance efforts if the treaty is signed and ratified.

Technical Survey

In the short and longer term the most important action is to carry out surveys to determine the true extent of the problem and to begin clearance efforts to reduce casualties. This takes time and is expensive. Even though about US$25,000,000 is being spent annually on demining in Bosnia and Croatia, we are only beginning to understand the true nature of the mine and unexploded ordnance problem there. Even so, only a few square kilometres are being cleared each year because clearance costs US$3-10 per square metre. With a similar cost structure Lebanon may require comparable amounts of money. However, the nature of the terrain throughout most of Lebanon (rugged, steep slopes, rocky soil) may mean that clearance is more expensive. The Bekaa valley, with extensive flat agricultural areas, may be easier to clear with machinery. However, the area contaminated with cluster bombs is potentially very large.

It will be essential that any survey operation be undertaken by an agency which has unrestricted access to the entire country.

The occupied zone in south Lebanon poses delicate political problems as well as the question as to who will pay for the cost of clearance. Israel has announced its intention to withdraw. However, the Lebanese government cannot negotiate with Israel on this issue, given current political constraints. I was surprised to find that the National Demining Office does not appear to have considered this issue, and the Lebanese government may not be aware of it. The Lebanese army is not permitted to operate anywhere near the occupied zone so they have no means for collecting information.

It is quite clear to me that the resources currently available in Lebanon are inadequate and cannot provide much more information on the problem, let alone deal with it effectively, even with current levels of US assistance. However, there are a few individuals who are highly capable of leading and developing an effective Lebanese organisation to deal with the problem. They need encouragement and financial support (e.g. National Demining Office staff, Landmines Resource Centre staff, World Rehabilitation Fund project managers). This support will not be forthcoming until there is wide awareness of the issue both in Lebanon itself and internationally.

Outside Support

With the growing number of countries seeking assistance for landmine clearance programs, it would be unwise for the Lebanese government to wait for higher levels of outside assistance to arrive from the major current donors to landmine programs (eg USA, Scandinavian countries, Germany, UK, Australia, Japan). Some financial assistance may be forthcoming from wealthy Arab countries, particularly if regional cooperation can be encouraged. Therefore, the government needs to encourage the accumulation of local capacity. There is no shortage of manpower, but there are economic difficulties and a shortage of know-how. The latter problem can easily be overcome by forming links with other countries which have more advanced mine clearance programs, like those in Northern Iraq and Afghanistan. Jordan has a well developed program, but the technical aspects are so different that their experience is less likely to be helpful.

UN Assessment

A UN team visited Lebanon early in 1999 and the report was released after my visit. There was great concern from several groups about the delay in producing the report.

The report seems to understate the problem, judging from the information I was able to acquire. This reflects the inability of the Army to acquire information from most of the country. The following sentence summarises the report's findings:

The impact of mines on economic infrastructure seems to be quite small, so the economy ought to be able to sustain a mine clearance program in the longer term.

Therefore, the most effective way of demonstrating the serious nature of the problem is to draw attention to the extent to which Lebanese resources (both private and public) have been directed at the problem, and to increase those resources.

Other Actions

• Continue and expand support for existing NGO's such as Landmines Resource Centre, World Rehabilitation Fund, and International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, particularly for building accurate records of civilian incidents.
• Assist both government and non-governmental organisations in Lebanon and in the Middle East region for mine awareness programs.
• Pressure needs to be applied internationally to the United States to provide classified information on render-safe procedures for ammunition of US origin. This is a problem in common with several other countries (eg Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam). Information on Russian, Chinese, Yugoslav and other ammunition is readily available.
• Support independent, neutral efforts to accumulate accurate and comprehensive historical data on military activities during the civil war. This data will be invaluable in assessing priorities for scarce mine clearance resources. This needs to be collected by confidential interviews as quickly as possible as this has been shown to be the most cost-effective method for assessing mine threats to civilians. The information needs to be made available to technical survey teams in such a way that local people can later add their own accounts. In many countries, it has been found that there are always a few local people who can remember where the mines were placed. Often they are not forthcoming until clearance and survey teams arrive in the area, and they know that they will not get into trouble for revealing the information. The French language magazine "Nourzan" was published weekly during the war and contained reasonably accurate information on fighting according to Harris (2000).
• Insist that Lebanese deminers learn from the experience of deminers elsewhere. The most appropriate experience (with similar terrain conditions) is in Northern Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghan deminers are willing to share their experience. Iraqi deminers speak essentially the same language.
• Evaluate the use of mine detection dogs to reduce the cost of mine clearance in Lebanon.

The need for mine and unexploded ordnance clearance in South Lebanon after the announced Israeli withdrawal needs to be recognised. However, I think that the manner in which this issue is raised needs very careful consideration within the larger context of the Middle East peace process.

Part 2: Technical Issues of Mine Clearance

National Demining Bureau

The NDB was set up by a council of ministers resolution on 15^th April 1998. The Commanding Officer, Col George Sowaya, was appointed because he has good communications abilities (person to person and media experience). A government team is trying to raise additional support for demining. The NDB has been set up with assistance from the US Government. Almost the entire NDO team was present when I met them, and they put on an impressive presentation using a laptop and projector. Their written report (attached) provides all the material except for photographs of the different mines they have found.

Some Issues Raised

All demining operations are under the control of the military. A policy decision has been taken not to involve civilians. NGO's are only to be involved in awareness campaigns and victim assistance. The main NGO involved at the present time is the World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF). The Landmines Resource Centre at Balamand University is providing useful data.

According to the NDB 285 minefields have been completely cleared. 292 known minefields have not been cleared. 209 minefields have received some 'treatment' but are not yet considered safe. No information on the area of these minefields was readily available, but this information is being compiled in a database.

There are many kinds of mines and UXO in the country, representing practically all known weapon manufacturers, due to the extraordinary diversity of sources for weapons used during the war. Mine types mentioned (with possible transcription errors since the mine types were not listed in the written report I received) were:

PMD6, PMN, PMN-2, MAPS, Isr 4 (box), Hungarian copy of VS50, PDP (French), M35 (French version of US AT mine), M7A2, M42 and many others. Several different kinds of cluster bombs have been found of US and Israeli origin. Many US ammunition types have been found and the NDB urgently needs information on how to neutralise them.

There are few metal detectors available to the Army and most are older types which are not suited to humanitarian demining operations.

The National Demining Office coordinates demining and UXO disposal operations, but draws on the Army Engineers for demining and ordnance disposal operations. This means they may have only indirect control over the operational side, particularly on the availability of resources. Certainly, the main activity seems to be responding to emergency requests for assistance. The majority of these seem to come from construction sites where UXO are found. The office staff spend much of their time on reconnaissance missions to assess the need for operational support.

A database is being compiled using 1:20000 digitised maps supplied by the US Army with an Access database to link other data. The NDB is building close links with other government agencies: Ministry for Health, Ministry for Environment and Ministry for Interior.

US assistance has been invaluable. Several specialists have attended courses in the USA, and the database will be very useful in the future. However, the instructors in the USA have little practical experience in field operations, and said at the end of the courses that the procedures would have to be dictated by local conditions.

The main demining procedure in use is manual prodding (see later descriptions and photographs). This is because the shortage of good metal detectors, mineralised soil, and high fragment density on most minefields being worked on. If a large area needs to be 'cleared', narrow lanes are cleared in a criss-cross pattern across the suspect area. If no mines are found, then a bulldozer is driven backwards and forwards across the suspect area to set off mines. The officers present were surprised when I pointed out to them that the ground pressure exerted by a bulldozer (or tank) is actually less than a human foot pressure in walking, and that this is known to be an unreliable method of mine clearance.

Booby traps are common, especially in urban areas, and have to be treated with great caution. There are few improvised explosive devices (IED's).

The NDB staff expressed a need for knowledge on international demining standards.

Many minefields have been cleared by the Army before the NDB was established. (From evidence in other countries, this is less than reliable).

A major initiative for the NDB is a mine awareness campaign due to be launched in October 1999. Several brochures and pamphlets were shown. These have been attractively designed. The campaign will be targetted at young people, from school age to University, and at the general public through TV. However the cost of TV exposure is a problem.

From the presentation I learned that they have an impressive team, several of whom have attended specialist training courses provided in the USA under the American assistance programme. Their technical knowledge is good, but their practical experience is limited.

The presentation took about an hour and a half, and we then moved off to the Souk El Gharb minefield where a demining team would demonstrate their procedures for me.

Minefield Photographs

An accompanying page provides photographs of minefield areas visited in Lebanon.

Technical Problems

The main technical problem facing deminers is the large land area which is suspected to contain mines. Beyond this, there are further problems common to several countries:

• Mines have been dislodged by floods and snow
• Severe winter weather restricts demining operations
• Mineralisation in soil and fragment density limits use of metal detectors
• Rocky steep terrain unsuited to machinery
• Vegetation (in some areas)
• Lack of information on mine distribution
• Need for protective equipment (readily solved with appropriate purchases)

There are two technical solutions which are readily available and which could make a big impact on the costs of mine and UXO clearance in Lebanon: mine detection dogs and aerial photography.

Mine Detection Dogs

From what I could see, mine detection dogs could significantly reduce the cost of demining in Lebanon. There does not seem to be a cultural problem in using dogs (compared with some other countries in the region). There is no local capacity at the moment, but there are many well-educated people who could contribute to building local capacity. Some plant species are prickly at certain times of the year, restricting the use of dogs.

The soils are light, dry and sandy (with limestone rocks) which seem to be good conditions for dogs to work in.

The climate (in the appropriate season) is benign with few environmental risks for the dogs.

Recommendation

Dogs are now used in several countries for mine and UXO clearance operations. Procedures vary from one country to another, but the following general principles apply in all of them.

First, each dog requires extensive training, together with his handler. This is usually done at a combined dog breeding and training centre. The dogs are tested within a few weeks of birth to assess their potential. After a few months, as skills improve, a selected dog will live with his handler 24 hours per day. (This is recommended by most experts but is not always the case.) The dog comes to see himself as another type of human, and the partnership formed with the handler will be a lifelong one. So strong is the bond between handler and dog that if the dog is killed or injured in a mine accident, the handler may be emotionally upset for many months afterwards. The dog becomes acutely sensitive both explosive vapour smells and human behaviour around him. This becomes important in testing the dog's performance later.

Once a dog and his handler reach the required level of performance for field work after about 2 years, they will be assigned to a demining dog field centre. This centre has appropriate accommodation and medical support for handlers and veterinary support for the dogs. The cost up to this stage is about US$8,500, though more recently, it is claimed, the training cost has been reduced to $1200 (in Afghanistan, where typical deminer pay is US$150 per month – costs are substantially higher elsewhere).

Other training programs use similar techniques, but it appears that each is different.

The dogs work best in dry, clear open country with vegetation no higher than calf to knee height (depending on vegetation and dog abilities). In Afghanistan, dogs are not used in wet conditions, thick vegetation or residential areas where, it is thought, the profusion of strong scents is likely to confuse the dogs.

The dogs will need supplementary training all the time, particularly if they are to work with different mines and/or devices containing different kinds of explosives. There is some debate about the length of training needed to 'convert' a dog to a new type of explosive or mine. In Afghanistan, daily refresher practice is part of the normal schedule, and a major refresher course is scheduled every two months.

The dog's reward for finding explosive is not food. It is a ball — "the Dutch method" — and this seems to be common to Afghanistan, South Africa, USA (Ronco) and European trained dogs. It is the appreciation and excitement of the handler which rewards the dog. Affection and food are always provided by the handler. Since finding explosives is, for the dog, a game or form of entertainment, the dog's performance will depend on his mood and level of interest in playing. On some days, a particular dog may not feel like playing (or may be unwell), in which case other dogs will be needed. Naturally, if the handler is not well, the dog cannot work. After some time, usually between 1 and 2 hours, the dog will be bored and will need some time to recover his interest in the 'game'.

A clearance task for dogs is set up by manual demining (which may require hand prodding if minimum metal mines cannot easily be detected by metal detectors). The manual deminers will clear safe access lanes (usually a metre wide) around the task area. The width of the task (across the wind direction) must be no longer than the length of the leash on the dog. In Afghanistan this is 8 metres. In Bosnia 10 metre and 15 metre lengths are common.

Another reason for manual clearance around the task is to check for tripwires. Some dogs have been trained to find tripwires, but there is disagreement on whether they can do this safely, particularly if the tripwire is extremely thin, or half buried under fallen vegetation. Since the average tripwire is 15-20 metres long, the size of any area to be checked by dogs must be less than this. In instances where short tripwires are encountered, dogs should not be used.

The dog is introduced to the task and commanded by the handler to traverse the upwind edge of the task. The handler then steps about 60 cm sideways, and the dog performs another traverse, and so on. If one dog completes an entire task area (see diagram), another dog is introduced with his handler and again checks the same task area. If neither dog indicates explosives, the task area is declared to be safe and clear.

Drawing: Mine dog clearance task layout: Afghanistan (see also minefield photos from Afghanistan)

A dog is trained to indicate the presence of explosive by calmly sitting a short distance from the location where the scent was discovered. When any dog indicates, the location is marked by placing markers on the edges of the task area. If this is the first dog, another dog will be introduced and will traverse the area up to the indicated location again. Manual deminers can safely approach the location across ground which has been 'cleared' by both dogs. Maybe the second dog will indicate a location which was missed by the first dog. In this case, it is this location which is checked first by manual deminers.

In Afghanistan, procedures require deminers to check an area 2 metres square around the location point, to a depth of up to 50 centimetres, or greater if there is evidence indicating a suspect target. They will use metal detectors (if possible) and manual prodding or probing (if possible). At all times they will only stand on the side which has been cleared by both dogs. Often this process reveals a shell fragment with a tiny piece of unburnt explosive adhering to the inside. However, the false alarm rate is low, and the total clearance cost using dogs is about one quarter (or less) that of manual demining using conventional methods. (Approx US$0.15 per sq metre with dogs, $0.65 per sq metre using manual demining).

After a location is checked by manual demining, clearance resumes from the location point, continuing to work downwind. The task is 8 metres (m) wide across the wind direction, but can be quite long along the wind direction. Ronco use 15 m x 15 m square boxes (a dog works at it from both sides on an 8 m leach, which allows for 1 m overlap.)

In Bosnia and Croatia (and Northern Iraq) deminers use 10 m x 10 m square boxes. If one dog indicates an explosive device in a square, then current procedures require the entire square to be cleared manually. Well organised dogs can check up to 3,000 sq metres per day each. However, this is very rarely achieved because manual deminers can never clear safe lanes and mark working boxes at this rate. The normal arrangement is one dog team (2 dogs/handlers) to a demining team of eight men. Some demining groups bring dogs in only on selected days after manual teams have cleared sufficient boxes to provide the dog team with enough work.

Another common kind of dog task in Croatia is ruined houses which have been deserted for up to 10 years. When the houses were wrecked, some militias left some mines to deter people from trying to return to their homes. Other times, fighting in the area resulted in UXO being left inside or around the houses. Typically it costs about US$2,000 to check a house and yard with dogs, including the cost of clearing vegetation beforehand. Often the exterior vegetation can be cleared mechanically using a remotely controlled mini-flail. Clearing the interior is more time-consuming. One operator explained to me that "dogs don't know where to expect booby traps so they check everywhere….my men think they know where the booby traps would have been placed so they don't look elsewhere".

Known Problems in Using Dogs

Dogs do not find every mine. Even in Afghanistan, where the mine detection dog program has been operating since 1989, there are reports of missed mines from time to time. Elsewhere, the results are varied. Recent testing in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown very poor performance by dogs. However, there are other test results which show satisfactory results. There are no standards which apply to dog performance testing.

The depth at which dogs can find mines also varies. There are reports of dogs finding AT mines as deep as 1 metre beneath unsealed roads, but then there are also reports of dogs missing similar mines less than 20 cm below the ground elsewhere (and even on the surface in some regions).

Dogs have not always been successfully introduced into demining theatres. Several known problems have been encountered, and it is important to be aware of these.

First, there may be disease problems. In Africa, mosquito and insect-born diseases have caused severe problems for dogs (and handlers too!). Food supplies need to be checked very carefully, and hygiene standards appropriate for 'foreigners' are essential. Veterinary support can be helpful in preventing some diseases through vaccination.

Quarantine restrictions can be troublesome in some countries, particularly if the dog needs to be keep quarantined for some time before entry. The handler needs to be with the dog during this period.

Dogs need to acclimatise after arrival in a new country and environment. They need time to orient themselves to a new world of sights, sounds and smells, just as the handler will. There is much disagreement, and few objective tests on the length of time needed. Times claimed for acclimatisation are between 2 weeks and 6 months.

Dogs will need to be trained on the types of mines and other targets they are expected to find. It is important to remember that the dog does not only smell explosive. In fact there is much discussion on what the dogs actually do smell. In some instances, dogs have been trained to find metal fragments when their number is small, and there has been trouble with training them to find particular UXO types. Some people claim that the dogs are sensitive not so much to explosives, but also to chemical by-products contained in the explosives or other parts of the mine, and even the smells associated with plastic packaging of the mine, or lubricating oils in the casings of UXO's. Some hardened skeptics claim that it is the human odor that the dogs pick-up and that is why they tend to find recently buried items that their trainer deposit but seem to miss even the landmines that are uncovered.

Training sites need extreme care. Practice targets need to be buried several weeks (at least) before the dogs are tested (or trained). The targets must be representative samples of the mines which the dogs are to locate. We do not know exactly what the dogs smell. Some people argue that the smell of additives in the plastic mine casing dominates the smell of explosive, but we know that human noses can smell some compounds much easier than others present in the same concentration.

The targets need to be handled carefully and with clean plastic gloves to avoid human scents contaminating them. Dummy targets need to be buried as well to ensure that the dogs are not simply finding places where something has been buried recently. Some targets can simply be hidden rather than being buried - this helps to avoid unnecessary distractions for the dog. Another issue is the order in which targets are placed. Some people attempt to arrange the targets such that the dog will encounter the hardest targets to detect first. Finally, there must be adequate separation between the targets - at least 20 to 30 metres.

There is some suspicion that dogs cannot work in certain soil and vegetation conditions where most if not all the explosive vapour is absorbed by the soil, running water, or plants, and cannot then be found by the dog. This may be associated with heavy clay soils with extremely fine particles.

Many of these issues are the subject of ongoing arguments between different people in the international demining community. Inevitably there are some vested interests which colour opinions stated from time to time. However, it is apparent that there are performance problems and more research is needed, with careful testing by dog users. Given our very limited understanding of canine physiology and behaviour, these issues may not be resolved clearly for some time.

Aerial Photography

Recommendation

Recent research completed by ITC (Netherlands) has shown that aerial photography can be extremely effective in locating the boundaries of mined areas, and even in locating exposed devices, particularly UXO.

This research also showed that highly sophisticated radar and infra-red technology (which is currently under export restrictions in any case) contributes almost no additional useful information. The aerial photographic techniques are readily available from specialist companies or defence establishments.

ITC used large format stabilised image cameras flown at a height of 300 metres and 150 knots air speed to obtain colour and infra-red stereo images of the ground beneath. Modern equipment and films can produce a resolution of about 2 millimetres under these conditions. ITC asserts that the cost of obtaining the photographs is about US$0.0001 per square metre, or about US$100 per square kilometre.

If vegetation is an issue the photographs need to be taken at a time and season when vegetation effects are minimised. In some climates this is winter time. In tropical climates, it may be the end of a hot dry season.

The photographs, in essence, provide a means to conveniently obtain a close-up view of the ground from above. Any evidence of mines visible from above can be seen in the photographs. Many old minefields are clearly visible because a proportion of the mines are exposed by weather and erosion. Others are visible through indirect evidence: trip wires are often visible, packaging may still be lying around, the remains of old fences (if any were constructed) may be visible.

In some areas, local people know where the mines are, and keep their grazing animals away. However, they may not be able to articulate a description of the locations for mine clearance personnel. Aerial photographs will reveal the evidence left by grazing patterns.

Sometimes, buried objects, particularly if buried in a regular pattern, will show clearly in aerial photographs, even though it seems impossible to see this at ground level. Many famous archaeological sites have been found under grazing lands or fields of crops through patterns showing up in aerial photographs.

Warfare leaves plenty of evidence in the ground which can be seen in photographs. Foxholes and trenches, even though almost completely eroded and filled in, can clearly be seen decades after fighting has finished. Sometimes, scatted items such as ammunition clips, cartridge cases, ammunition boxes or even army style cooking equipment will reveal the location of military installations long afterwards, and thus indicate where mines are likely to be found.

Acknowledgments

Financial support for this research is provided by the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate of the US Army, private donations to the University of Western Australia, and a study leave travel grant from the University of Western Australia. My visit to Lebanon could not have been so comprehensive without the support and encouragement of staff at the Australian Embassy, Beirut, who arranged many of the interviews and visits, and supplied official transport for part of my programme. Samina Yasmeen led me through the intricacies of Middle East politics. Most of all, I would like to thank all the Lebanese people we met who looked after us, made us feel at home, entertained us, gave us so much to eat, and made us feel sad to leave after such a short time.

References

Aoun, H. Landmines Resource Centre, Balamand University Notes of Interview September 1999.

T. Friedman. From Beirut to Jerusalem, 2^nd edition. Harper Collins, 1995, pp 1-247.

W. Harris. Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars and Global Extensions. Markus Wiener, Princeton, New Jersey USA, 350 pages.

W. Harris. Personal Communication, February 2000.

Department of State, USA. (1999) To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining, April 1999.

UN Database on Landmines: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/

UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations: Mine Action Service (UNMAS): http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/

World Rehabilitation Fund (1999) Preventing Injuries and Managing the Social Burden of Landmines in Lebanon Progress REport June-December 1998.

| Demining Home Page | James Trevelyan's Home Page | UWA Home page |
Updated January 2000
For more information on any of this material look at our enquiries page
Webmaster: Edin Tabak All graphics by Demining Research Team. Copyright University of Western Australia 2000