During a recent visit to Pakistan I spoke with many well-informed people. Thanks to Noel for the photographs and for the many others for their information. These photographs were taken during assessment missions to Kabul in January 2002 by Noel Spencer, chief technical officer with the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan.

• First Group
• Second Group
• Third Group

The photos show the range of unexploded ordnance contaminating Kabul. The area affected extends to approximately 5 km away from each of the many sites bombed in October and November 2001. It is estimated that it will take most of 2002 to dispose of the enormous quantity of unexploded ordnance that now poses the largest threat to Afghan populations in the major cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, Khandahar and Herat. In many areas, the material (rockets, mortar shells, missiles, mines, grenades etc.) lies ankle deep in streets, gardens, rooftops and even graveyards.

US cluster bomb submunitions also pose a sigificant threat, but almost all strikes within the city areas have been cleaned up within a few weeks. However, most CB strikes were outside urban areas and these are presently inaccessible. Most of the demining equipment used before the conflict has been lost, bombed or stolen. This includes transport vehicles, detectors, radios, GPS receivers, survey equipment, personal protective equipment and mechanical clearance vehicles such as back hoes. The Japanese government has generously agreed to replace all the lost equipment but this will take time.

For the time being, the priorities are to clear urban areas of UXO contamination shown in these photographs, gradually restore the mine detection dog capacity, and perhaps to return to mine clearance operations late in 2002. Transport vehicles are desperately needed at the moment to distribute food and move refugees to secure areas: the survival of millions of Afghans through the winter depends on this.

While 4.5 billion dollars has been pledged to Afghanistan by the international community over the next 3 years (on average), we need to remember that this amounts to only US$0.20 per person per day for 20,000,000 Afghans. Survival will cost more than this. UN authorities are concerned that pledges for 2003 and later years are far from guaranteed. It costs around US$0.80 per day for one person to be fed, clothed, housed and either employed or given basic education. Unless substantial increases in funding are forthcoming, (such as remittances from family members living abroad) the only option open to ordinary Afghans is to return to growing opium. This trend is well-established, and it is likely that the fighting that continues in many parts of Afghanistan currently reflects attempts to gain control over these crops and the associated heroin factories.

What is likely to happen in Afghanistan in future months and years?

First, the traditional tribal power structures in Afghanistan have been largely destroyed. During the Russian occupation, many senior figures emigrated to other countries. Those forced to live in refugee camps saw a gradual erosion of respect for their status. This continued, with a different population of exiles, during the Taliban era. Now Taliban are in exile and refugee leaders are returning.

In some parts of Afghanistan they return to valleys with almost complete destruction of all buildings as a result of recent bombing by the US. In the words of one Afghan "I heard there was trouble in my area. I went there. All the houses were gone. The whole valley has stones scattered from the houses: you cannot work out where the houses were. You cannot even find the bodies to see who was killed, only small pieces that might have been people or animals. I am very sad. I do not know who has survived - I am lucky".

It is possible that some of the US bombing has resulted from false intelligence information supplied by Afghan groups that wanted to see rival groups eliminated.

The drought and 20 years of war have all but destroyed food production capacity, irrigation systems, transport networks and orchards in much of Afghanistan. Although there has not been so much fighting in surrounding areas, parts of Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been decimated by drought and internal struggles. These countries need aid just as much as Afghanistan, but this looks unlikely at the time of writing. Failure to provide these countries with aid will lead their people to wonder what they need to do to get the kind of assistance currently going into Afghanistan.

The need to move drugs out of Afghanistan will provide a fertile environment for organizations that wish to operate outside control of government and international agencies. This is not likely to lead to sustainable peace and re-development of Afghanistan.

One can only hope that the international community realizes that more needs to be done. Failure in Afghanistan could have wide repercussions elsewhere, and a loss of confidence amoung developed states.

It has been said in both Pakistan and Afghanistan that these countries are the ultimate proof of God's existence. Human beings have tried so hard to destroy these countries, but somehow they are still there. Optimism like this will be needed in huge quantities in the coming years.

For some recent contributions to debate on reconstruction in Afghanistan, refer to the the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website at http://www.ceip.org/files/news/newsnews.asp, articles by Martha Brill Olcott and Marina Ottaway who provide more background on some of the issues raised here.

Perhaps we could end with a joke that passes round Afghanistan.

Two neighbours with a common wall were arguing over the ownership of a cruise missle that had not exploded, but had ended up with its front, said one neighbour, with "65%" in his house and the rear, said the other neighbour, with "55%" in his house. (Most people like to exaggerate in support of their claims). They could not agree on who owned it and who could sell the missile. They called in the mullah from the local mosque who decided that the man who had most of the missile was the owner. The other neighbour was very upset with this decision. The mullah advised him to pray that the US could send him another missile!

The views expressed here represent the results of extensive interviews by the author, James Trevelyan, and are not the official views of the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan or associated agencies.